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ABSTRACT: Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, 
the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and 
killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue 
that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, 
and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally 
significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there 
is any, it seems to favor active instead of passive euthanasia. Therefore, while 
the distinction between active and passive euthanasia might be meaningful in 
terms of description, if it is considered to be endowed with moral weight and 
used on purpose of justifying one type of euthanasia instead of the other, it 
becomes morally problematic and misleading.
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All moral issues concerning the deliberate taking of the life of another 
person are always morally problematic and highly controversial. This means 
that, whatever are the reasons for supporting one or the other view, these 
reasons have to be strong and meaningful, and bolstered by sound arguments. 
Euthanasia – by this term I refer to the taking of the life of a terminal patient 
in extreme agony and intense suffering according to her persistent and 
informed request on the sole purpose of relieving her from intolerable pain1 
– undoubtedly has some quite persuasive arguments on its side. Respect for
patient’s autonomy,2 for her so-called right to die3 and her right to privacy,4 
treating her as an end and not solely as a means,5 opting for an allegedly
1  McLean, Sh., “End-of-life decisions and the law”, Journal of Medical Ethics, 22:5 (1996), 
p. 262.
2  Nowell-Smith, P., “Euthanasia and the doctors – a rejection of the BMA’s report”, Journal of
Medical Ethics, 15:3 (1989), p. 128.
3  Robertson, J.A., “Cruzan: No Rights Violated”, Hastings Center Report, 20:5 (1990), p.9.
4  Humphry, D. & Wickett, A., The Right to Die – Understanding Euthanasia, Bodley Head,
London, 1986, p. 68.
5  Bix, Br., “Physician Assisted Suicide and the United States Constitution”, Modern Law
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optimum balance between gains and losses,6 all these are good reasons why 
one would consider euthanasia as a moral option for herself and claim it, and 
others should either respect her claim, or resort to equally persuasive moral 
arguments in order not to. As a matter of fact, there are arguments equally 
strong and convincing in either sides of the debate, and this is why the debate 
is still an active one. When, however, the focus is shifted – from whether and 
under which circumstances is euthanasia morally justifiable – to the way it 
should be performed, there seems to be less controversy. Most ethicists agree 
that if euthanasia should be permitted, it should be performed passively and 
not actively. Allow me to focus a bit more on this distinction.
Active euthanasia is performed usually by means of injecting the patient 
with a lethal drug. Of course there are other ways to actively take the life of 
the patient, but since a lethal injection is by far the most efficient, most humane 
and less dramatic one, it is favored in the majority of such cases.7  Passive 
euthanasia is usually achieved by withdrawing any life supporting means – 
such as the respirator, the external heart pump, the hemodialysis machine – by 
virtue of which the patient is being kept alive, or by withholding food and 
water.8 The active termination of the patient’s life is usually denounced on 
moral grounds; it is considered to be killing, and thus morally unjustifiable.9 
The withdrawal of life-supporting means, on the other hand, is assumed to be 
letting someone die, and thus not morally rejected.10 In the first case, this of 
active euthanasia, she who performs it actively intervenes with the patient’s 
life and kills her; in the latter, that of passive euthanasia, she who inflicts 
death does so by omitting to intervene – she just ‘let nature take its course’ 
or ‘the condition of the patient develop’11 – as far as the use of life-supporting 
machines is concerned, of course. Since killing someone is usually to morally 
harm or wrong her, but failing to prevent one’s death is not per se wrongful, 
active euthanasia is considered to be as morally unjustifiable as killing is, while 
Review 58:3 (1995), p. 411.
6  Dyck, A.J., “Physician -Assisted -Suicide: Is it Ethical?”, Harvard Divinity Bulletin, 21:4 
(1992), p.17.
7  Munson, R., Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, Belmont, 1983, p. 181.
8  Stewart, G.T., Curter, W.R. & Demy, T.J., Suicide and Euthanasia, Kregel Publications, 
Grand Rapids, 1998, p. 23.
9  Beauchamp, T.L., Intending death: The ethics of assisted suicide and Euthanasia, Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, 1995, p. 3.
10  Beauchamp, T.L. & Childress, J.F., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994.
11  Baird, R.M., & Rosenbaum, S., Euthanasia: The moral issues, Prometheus Books, New 
York, 1989, p. 12.
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passive euthanasia is considered as morally neutral as failing to prevent the 
death of, let’s say, the victims of a car accident somewhere in the world. This 
approach, however, in my mind remains arbitrary and morally unjustifiable. 
Acting and omitting to act according to common sense as well as in the 
eyes of the law usually fall under distinct categories. In ethics, however, this is 
not always the case.12 Consider a case in which A puts false charges for murder 
against you on purpose of having you convicted. Her act is blameworthy and 
morally unjustifiable, since she has purposefully lied in order to harm you. 
Now consider the case in which false charges are put against you by the state, 
charges that would immediately fall if B, the only person who would confirm 
your alibi, did so with no consequence whatsoever on her. However, B doesn’t 
do this although she could with no personal cost at all, she again on purpose of 
having you convicted. In the first case A acts in order to wrong and harm you, 
while in the second B does nothing of the kind to prevent you being harmed. 
Nevertheless, B wrongs you no less than A does, and B’s omission to testify 
for your innocence is equally blameworthy to A’s actions intending to your 
conviction, since her intention was no different at all: both have proceeded 
in their actions (or omissions) with the intention to wrong and harm you. The 
same applies to euthanasia: intentionally letting one die when you can save 
her is no less morally blameworthy (or praiseworthy) than intentionally killing 
her. In both cases the intention of the agent, her purpose, and the results of 
her options are identical. The only thing that differs is the means she chooses 
to achieve her ends, to wit the death of the terminally ill and in terrible pain 
patient according to the latter’s own free and informed will. In other words, 
in the case of euthanasia whether the moral agent acts or omits to act is only 
a matter of strategic planning, and not a moral one. The moral decision is the 
same for both options: in the best possible scenario, she who inflicts death has 
decided to relieve the patient of her hopeless agony. In my view, there is slight 
morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, if any.
In addition to these, in the case of euthanasia – bearing in mind the way 
it is usually performed in both its possible scenarios – it is most of the times 
extremely difficult to tell action from omission.13 Take for example the lethal 
injection scenario on the one hand, and the withdrawal of the respirator on the 
other. It is very hard to tell why the first is deemed an action, while the second 
is not. It doesn’t take to be an apt master of abstract meditation to conclude that 
injecting someone is as much performing an action as shutting down a machine. 
12  Rachels, J., “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” in Singer, P., (ed.), Applied Ethics, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986, p. 31.
13  Prado, C.G., & Taylor, S.J., Assisted Suicide: Theory and practice in elective death, 
Humanity Books, New York, 1999, p. 11.
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Still, when it comes to euthanasia, shutting down a respirator is considered to 
be an omission, and not an action. The rationale usually brought forth is that 
the respirator is an artificial means of keeping someone alive, one that hadn’t 
been invented, the patient would long have expired.14 In other words, attaching 
a patient to a machine is acting to keep her alive; disconnecting her, however, 
is omitting to act, in order to let nature take its course. This, of course, is no 
more of a justification for withdrawing the respirator than it is for denying 
a patient any other achievement of medical technology. Imagine a case, for 
example, in which the victim of a car accident in need of immediate surgery 
is denied this service with the rationale that surgeries in general are artificial 
means of interfering with one’s life, and had surgical instruments not been 
invented and developed, she would have no access to such a service. Every 
human-invented instrument – including medical ones – surely didn’t exist until 
someone created it, but this is no good excuse for refraining from using it 
when it has become available and we are able to make use of it. Anyway, if 
a doctor denied her patient access to the respirator in any other instance, she 
would promptly be accused for acting wrongfully and for neglecting her duty; 
in the case of passive euthanasia, however, the same decision is treated as 
refraining from acting. However, it is hard to find a morally compelling reason 
to accept this difference.
Apart from these, in my opinion there are some good reasons to choose 
active over passive euthanasia in any case. Given that euthanasia is by 
definition a humanitarian response to a patient’s agony, if one examines the 
way the patient expires in the case of each one of the two ways in which 
euthanasia is performed, it seems difficult to tell why passive euthanasia is 
considered to be a good death at all. As I mentioned above, passive euthanasia 
is usually performed by means of either withholding food or water, or by 
withdrawing life-sustaining machines. In the first case death comes slowly and 
in an indecent way out of dehydration or starvation, while in the second the 
patient dies out of suffocation (in the case she is disconnected from a respirator) 
or gradual intoxication (if she is detached from a hemodialysis machine), etc. 
In all cases, death comes in such agony and is being prolonged in such an 
unwanted degree, that makes one wonder why such a death is considered to 
be a good one, or at least a better ending than the inevitable ‘natural’ one. In 
contrast, active euthanasia – which is usually being performed by means of a 
lethal injection to the patient – guarantees an instant and an as less agonizing 
as possible death. The patient departs in a humane and descent way, according 
to her initial will. If this is so, then why passive euthanasia is usually favored 
over active one? I think only because its legal consequences for her who 
14  Callahan, D., “Pursuing a Peaceful Death”, Hastings Center Report, 23:4 (1993), p. 34.
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performs euthanasia are less dramatic in comparison to active euthanasia, if 
any.15 Opting for passive euthanasia is not at all securing an easy and good 
death for the patient; rather it is just a guarantee that the doctor who performs 
it avoids any consequence for her deed. It is not intended to serve the patient’s 
best interests, but those of others who engage in it. Choosing passive instead of 
active euthanasia seems like doing the right thing (assuming that performing 
euthanasia is right at the first place) by resorting to the wrong means. Apart 
from this, it implies an unnecessary and hardly justifiable normative shift 
in one’s moral approach towards euthanasia: in respecting her request for 
euthanasia the patient is being thought of as an end in herself; in choosing the 
means of fulfilling her request, the patient is dealt with as a mere means to 
somebody else’s ends. Even for those who are not into the Kantian tradition, 
this seems to be somewhat inconsistent.
So far I have argued that the distinction between purposeful action and 
purposeful omission is morally insignificant concerning euthanasia, and that 
active euthanasia – being a far more humane and descent way to depart – 
should be preferable on moral grounds, in particular as serving the patient’s 
best interests and as an enduring indication that the patient is being treated not 
only as a means, but also as an end. It is only a logical step forward to argue 
that, since the distinction between active and passive euthanasia seems to be 
not only morally irrelevant, but also harmful to the only actual beneficiary of 
it, the dying patient, insofar as euthanasia is being debated as a moral issue, 
this distinction can only be misleading and confusing and, therefore, it should 
be abandoned.16 If euthanasia is morally justifiable, it should be such only 
because it stands for a humanitarian response to a fellow human’s suffering, 
and not due to obscure and unsubstantiated moral excuses.
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